Achaemenid Archery

Lendering states that:

“Farrokh confuses … the archery attacks at Marathon and Thermopylae (p.227)… In his description of the battle of Marathon, Farrokh suggests that "wave after wave of missiles ... rained down upon the Athenians" (p.72) - a rather inefficient use of archery, because enemies can prepare for receiving a rain of showers, but not for irregular, continuous shooting”.

Lendering’s statement was referred to a number of military historians in Greece, Iran and the US/Canada. The consensus is that Lendering’s statement is misinformed.

Most interesting however is that Lendering must surely he must be aware of Classical references to the “sky going black” as a result of Persian archery.

The Achaemenids were very organized and methodical in their attacks, especially with archery.

Their archers shot a large quantity of missiles in regular waves; these methods also having an Assyrian legacy. These facts are verified by sources such as the following:

Khorasani, M. (2006). Arms and Armor from Iran: From the Bronze Age to the Qajar Era. Germany: Legat-Verlag.

Motofi, A, (1999). Tarikh-e-Chahar Hezar Sal-e Artesh-e Iran: Az Tamadon-e Elam ta 1320 Khorsheedi, Jang-e- Iran va Araqh [The 4000 Year History of the Army of Iran: From the Elamite Civilizaiton to 1941, the Iran-Iraq War]. Tehran: Entesharat-e Iman.

Newark, T. (2000). Ancient Armies, England: Concord Publications Company.

Shahbazi, Sh. (1986). Army, Pre-Islamic Iran. Encyclopeadia Iranica, 2, 489-499.

The typical Persian infantry unit was composed of up to 10 ranks. Very large quantities of arrows were fired at the Greeks in the attempts to disrupt their compact formations. Below is a recreation by Duncan Head:

Source: Head, D. (1992). The Achaemenid Persian Army. Stockport, England: Montvert Publications.

Note that archers fire in succession (i.e. first 2 front rows fire, while the two behind them “reload”, etc.).

The Greek military doctrine and equipment enabled them to withstand the Persian missile salvos. The “irregular shooting” that Lendering describes is irrelevant from a military standpoint – the issue is the combination of Greek compact formations, armour and the ability (or inability) of missiles to penetrate these during battle. As noted by the late Professor Shapur Shabazi, Achamenid archery:

“…failed against heavily-armed Greek infantry (hoplites)…the arrows were simply stopped by the body armour and the huge shield of the hoplites… ”

Shahbazi, Sh. (1986). Army, Pre-Islamic Iran. Encyclopeadia Iranica, 2, pp.493.

An intriguing question however is this: how would shooting “irregularly” force a change in the Greek phalanx formation? The Greek formations were highly disciplined and worked as one unit. Their formations remained intact irrespective of “type” of shooting.

A very good visual example of this has been provided by the Hollywood movie “Gladiator” starring actor Russell Crowe who played the Roman general Maximus. In the opening scene of the Romans fighting against the Germanic warriors in the forests of northern Europe there is a short scene which shows the Romans advancing in regular serried ranks. In the melee that follows, the Germanic warriors then charge wildly and “irregularly” (as Lendering would probably characterize it) towards the Romans – these then halt abruptly and unpredictably fire their arrows. The well-trained Romans (whose fighting methods have strong Hellenic roots) would simply adopt the tortoise position by covering their front and top by overlapping their shields. The tortoise position is applicable in either scenario - irrespective of whether we speak of “irregular” or “regular” shooting. The issue is the penetrating power of missiles versus the ability of the Greco-Roman shields and armor to resist (missile) penetration.

A modern analogy is that of tough-skinned military vehicles (i.e. tanks) and their ability to resist small arms fire (i.e. automatic rifles or heavier machine guns). Whether one fires small arms in a “regular” or “irregular” fashion makes no difference when the opponent(s) are heavily armored tanks: the bullets simply bounce off the armor irrespective of “type of shooting”.
In this discussion at least, Lendering has probably not engaged in deliberate distortion of Farrokh’s text; he has simply failed to appreciate the finer military issues in history. The relevant topic here is the age-old technological race between projectiles (arrows, bullets, etc.) and armor. This is a vast topic for discussion however the references cited in this section are more than sufficient for education in this topic.

The one area where the Achaemenids did engage in “irregular” warfare was in hand to hand combat during their failed invasions of ancient Greece. They often charged at the Greek formations only to be mercilessly cut down. This was the case in Thermopylae (480 BC) or Plataea (479 BC) and none would contest these facts. In the latter case, the Achaemenids even attempted to break the spears of the Greek formations, to no avail.

Farrokh has also collaborated with Greek graduate students in Australia in archery research. In this endeavour, Persian archery techniques of the Achaemenid era were studied (including the recreation of the firing patterns of ancient Persian archers).

A few more references pertaining to Achaemenid archery in the Classical era are:

Drews, R. (1993). The End of the Bronze Age: Changes in Warfare and the Catastrophe ca. 1200 B.C. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Freiman, A.A. (1948). Plenennyi Vrag Dariya – Skif Skunha. Izvestiya Akademii Nauk Otdelenie Literatury i Jazyka, 7(3), 235-240. [There is an excellent section here on ancient Iranian archery]

Heath, E,G. (1980). Archery: A Military History. London: Osprey Publishing Limited.

Hammond, N.G.L. (1997). Genius of Alexander the Great. North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press.  [Excellent descriptions of Achaemenid archery and how Greek military arts defeated this]

More references may be cited, however at this junction these may prove superfluous. Suffice it to say that Lendering appears to have serious misconceptions with respect to ancient Iranian warfare. The aforementioned Shabazi and Khorasani references may hopefully help clear these views.