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Footnotes
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[1]Robbins notes that the interpretation of history in Turkey is characterized by rigidity, partly a result of the traumatic period between 1918-1923. The success of the new republic which arose from the ashes of the Ottoman Empire and the constant eulogizing of Attaturk and those who fought for Turkish independence. See Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War, Hurst & Company, London, p.104. [1] This quote follows the preface of Mustafa Kemal Attaturk, The Speech, translated and abridged by Onder Renkliyildirim (Istanbul: Metro Publishers), p.4. Also cited in Robins, Philip, 2003, Suits and Uniforms, p.93. [1] Poulton, H. Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, 1997, P.110-114. Robins, Philip, 2003, Suits and Uniforms, p.93-95. [1] The phenomenon of politicians acting as historians first occurred during the Young Turk movement(). Notable are figures such as Ahmed Agaoglu, Yusuf Akcura, Ziya Gokalp, Fuad Korpulu. [1] Key political figures Agaoglu, Gokalp, and Akcura both believed in the need for close cooperation between the government and historical societies. For an insight into the activities of Akcura in this regard see F. Georgeon, Aux Origines du Nationalisme Turc: Yusuf Akcura (1876-1935) (Paris: Institut d’Etudes Anatoliennes, 1980), p.234-236. Agaoglu’s activities can be examined in Frank Tachau, “The Search for National Identity Among the Turks’, Die Welt Des Islams, vol.8, no.3, 1963, p.174. [1] Taner Timur, “The Ottoman heritage” in Irvin C. Schick and Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak (eds.), Turkey in Transition (Oxford University Press, 1987), p.6. [1] Elements of this “Thesis” had already been incorporated into various school textbooks since 1929. See also Poulton, H. Top Hat, Grey Wolf and Crescent, 1997, P.101. [1] Robins, Philip, 2003, Suits and Uniforms, p.93. [1] Afghanistan was not recognized as such according to historical archives until the year 1747 at the earliest. [1] This was held in the Washington Convention Centre. The display was entitled “Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Yesterday and Today: A Cultural experience”. See Jalal Matini, “Persian artistic and literary pieces in the Saudi Arabian exhibition”, Iranshenasi: A Journal of Iranian Studies, 1989b, p.390-404. [1] Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War, Hurst & Company, London, p.96. [1] Ibid. [1] Atabaki, T., Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and the Struggle for Power in Iran, p.7. [1] Kasravi, A. Azeri ya Zaban-e Bastan-e Azarbaijan, 2nd print, Tehran, Taban, 1938, p.8. [1] It is notable that this region was identified as the land in which Zoroastrian “fire-temples were very common”, as cited in Yaqut al-Hamavi, Kitab Mujam Al Buldan, Wustenfled F. (ed.) vol.1, Leipzig, Brockhaus, 1866, p.17. [1] Atabaki, T., Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and the Struggle for Power in Iran, p.7. [1] Strabo Geographica, see p. 17-18 regarding Azerbaijan and Arran. [1] Matini, Jalal, “Azerbaijan Koja Ast?”, 1989, Iranshenasi, I(3), p.452. [1] Ibid. [1] Ibid. [1] Ibid. [1] Matini, Jalal, “Azerbaijan Koja Ast?”, 1989, Iranshenasi, I(3), p.452. [1] Ibid. [1] Ibid. Matini also notes that Greater Azerbaijan nationalists such as Abbas-Ali Javadi have inaccurately cited the new republic as having been the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. This may perhaps be an attempt to provide a historical (albeit fictional) background for the rise of the Soviet-supported Pishevari movement in Iranian Azerbaijan in the mid-1940s. [1] Chaqueri, Cosroe, Origins of Social Democracy in Iran, 2001, p.209. [1] Matini, Jalal, “Azerbaijan Koja Ast?”, 1989, Iranshenasi, I(3), p.445. [1] The Ottoman Turks had successfully defeated and expelled the Russians from Kars on April 26, 1918, a full month before the declaration of the “Republic of Azerbaijan”. For the little studied area of Ottoman operations and personnel in the Caucasus and Iran during World War One, consult Nicolle, David, The Ottoman Army: 1914-1918, 1994, p.37, 39-40. [1] Matini, Jalal, “Azerbaijan Koja Ast?”, 1989, Iranshenasi, I(3), p.452. [1] Ibid. [1] Chaqueri, Cosroe, Origins of Social Democracy in Iran, 2001, p.118, 174-181, 209-210. [1] Rasulzadeh, Mohammad Amin, 1910, Tanqid-e Ferqeh-e E’tedaliyun ya Ejtema’iyun E’tedaliyun, Tehran, Farus. See also citation by Atabaki, Touraj, Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and the Struggle for Power in Iran, 2000, p.38. [1] Pan-Turanian activists also portray Khiyabani as a sort of “closet separatist”. Refer to Atabaki’s 2000 text for further discussion. [1] Kasravi, A. Tarijh-e-Hejdah Saleh-e Azarbaijan, op. cit., p.872. [1] Blucher, W.V., Zeitenwende, Persian Translation: Safar-nameh-e-Blucher, Tehran, Khwarami, 1984, p.37. Tancoigne, A Narrative, p.177. See Ayandeh (1988), vol 4, no.s 1-2, p. 57-59). [1] Ramazani, R., op. cit. p.115. See also citation by Atabaki, Touraj, Azerbaijan: Ethnicity and the Struggle for Power in Iran, 2000, p.25. [1] Chaqeri, Origins of Social Democracy in Iran, p.209; Watson, A History, p.26; Bassett, The Land of Imams, p.266; US Consular Report, p.294. [1] Matini, Jalal, “Azerbaijan Koja Ast?”, 1989, Iranshenasi, I(3), p.449. [1] The author, who is born in Greece, met a number of ex-Greek communists who had fought against Athens on Russia’s behalf after the Second World War. After their defeat, they retreated to Skopje in Yugoslavia, which was re-named by the Communists as “Macedonia”. Russia then bought a number of these to prop up Pishevari’s flagging movement. [1] The Mazdak rebellion fought centuries earlier during the pre-Islamic Sassanian regin, are also reputed to have worn red garments. [1] History has seen repeated instances of a minority group introducing its language upon a majority population. The Romance-speaking population of Pannonia adopted the Turkic language of the Hunnic invaders of Attila. Again, the actual genetic trace of the original Magyar Turkic invaders is negligible (see Cavalli-Sforza in references). As noted by Professor Colin Renfrew (see references) languages can be spread by conquest, agricultural and economic factors, occupation of uninhabited lands, and climate changes forcing population movements. [1] The pope officially forgave his would-be assassin in the December of 1983. [1] Olson, Robert, 2004, p.108-109. Citation from Hurriyet, 6 February 2001. [1] Olson, Robert, 2004, p.108-109. [1] Robins, Philip, 2003, Suits and Uniforms, p.78-79. [1] Engdahl, 2004, p.171. [1] Robert Eringer has provided a rare and detailed report on the Bilderberg Group as well as the Trilateral Commission and other covert power groups in the western world. See references for details. [1] Dreyfus and LeMarc, 1980, p.157. [1] “Pakhtunistan” would assist in the process of the disintegration of Pakistan, Iran and possibly Afghanistan. [1] As with the Al-Ahwaz and Arabian Gulf projects, the Azerbaijan project is being supported by lobbies harboring economic objectives. As noted by Olson, “…the growth of Azeri nationalism facilitated US and EU efforts to make the Caspian basin region a ‘second Persian Gulf’…” (Turkey-Iran Relations, 1979-2004, 2004, p.155-156). [1] Olson, 2004, p.89. [1] Dr. Shaffer asked the US Congress in 2002 to lift long-standing US sanctions on the Republic of Azerbaijan despite long-standing concerns with the Republic’s human rights records and anti-democratic procedures.. [1] Dr. Shaffer has given speeches to the nationalist, pan-Azeri Vatan Society in Britain in 2004. [1] Afshin Molavi, a US-based Iranian analyst, has noted that Shaffer’s book has "captivated the attention of [Iranian] regime change advocates in Washington." [1] Matini, Jalal, “Azerbaijan Koja Ast?”, 1989, Iranshenasi, I(3), p.447. [1] Ibid. [1] Ibid. [1] The professor’s knowledge of all phonological and orthographic (Arabic-based) varieties of Persian are impressive. The Professor showed the author during his interview, a copy of old Tajiki hand-written manuscripts that he was researching. Maclean is also versed in the Dehlavi (Moghul Indian) style of Persian, the Masnavi of Jallale-Din Rumi, the Golestan Saadi and the Divan-e- Hafez. [1] By “nation building” I assume that the Professor meant Iranian nationalism attempts at nation-building. This means that Iranians have invented Azerbaijan’s history as a way of keeping that province in Iran. [1] “Released Britons return to Iraq”, BBC TV News Broadcast June 25th, 2004, also available on the following website http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3837943.stm. [1] Iran's Arabic language Al-Alam television noted after the seizure of the British and their equipment that “…on board (the seized boats of the British) they (Iranian authorities) found weapons and spy cameras, plus detailed maps of areas within Iran and Iraq." The full text of this broadcast is provided in the on-line Payvand News network site of June 23, 2004 edition, http://www.payvand.com/news/04/jun/1141.html. [1] Ibid. [1] Gedye, Robin & Savill, Richard “Iran releases eight captured servicemen”, The Telegraph, June 25th, 2004, also available on the following website http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2004/06/25/wiran25.xml. [1] Ref [1] Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War, Hurst & Company, London, p.172-173. [1] Ibid. [1] Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War, Hurst & Company, London, p.81. [1] Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish Foreign Policy Since the Cold War, Hurst & Company, London, p.81. it is interesting to note that when British Foreign Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind visited Turkey in September 1995, the Turks made their dissatisfaction with British sponsorship of Med-TV very clear to the secretary. [1] For further discussion of the nucluer issue, refer to Professor Kaveh Afrasiabi’s article “US media and Iran's nuclear threat” (see Web References).
[1] One tiny piece of inconsistency is worthy of note: politically unstable Pakistan, with its vast arsenal of nucleur bombs, is not seen as a threat. This is very illogical, as much of the nation’s populace and upper leadership seethes with anti-US sentiment, and there is a genuine danger of a Taliban style takeover. The Taliban are highly irrational and bear a fanatic hatred of the west. Rather than finally confront reality, mainstream American analysts continue to parrot the fallacy that all Pakistanis and Saudis are friends of the United States.
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