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Iran and Non proliferation Treaty Morteza Aminmansour Dec 02, 2004 Seattle, USA
The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear Weapons (NTP) is one of the great successes stories of arms control. It has made major contributions to global security and economic well being. The NPT is an indispensable tool in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons.
By 1964, there were five declared nuclear weapons states: The United states, the United Kingdom, France, China, the former Soviet. The NPT established a political and legal barrier to the spread of nuclear weapons. From 43 original arties in1970 the number grew to 96 in 1975, 132 in 1985, and stand at nearly 190 today. Israel, Pakistan, India remain outside the Treaty. North Korea joined the NPT in 1985, but in January 2003 announced its intention to withdraw from the Treaty.
The security benefits of the NPT are evident in every region of the World. Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia in 1998 posed a continuing challenge.
The international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), founded in 1957. The implementation of IAEA safeguards are further evidence of the way in which the NPT strengthens international security. Safeguards under the Treaty, including international inspections help to deter the use of nuclear material for nuclear explosive purposes. The members of the IAEA have taken measures to strengthen the Agency's safeguards system. These include reaffirmation of the IAEA right to conduct special inspection and the use of new tools for the detection of clandestine nuclear facilities. In 1997, the IAEA adopted a model protocol for existing safeguards agreements under the NPT that is designed to give the IAEA a stronger role and more effective tools for conducting Worldwide inspections. The NPT creates a vital and irreplaceable framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation by providing assurances that non-nuclear weapon state NPT parties will devote their nuclear programs exclusively to peaceful purposes. The NPT is vital for security, arms control and disarmament, and economic and social development throughout the world. By rededicating themselves to the NPT, its parties can ensure that this treaty will play an even more vital role in the new millennium.
Under Article I (NPT), the nuclear weapon states undertake not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not to assist encourage or induce any non- nuclear - weapon state to manufacture.
IRAN
Iran has a long standing program of exploration for Uranium, and has selected two locations for development as mines. At the SAGHAND mine, located in YAZD in central Iran. The annual estimated production design capacity is forecast as 50 t of Uranium. More production is forecast to start by the end of 2006. More is to be processed into Uranium ore concentrate at the associated mill at ARDAKAN, the yellowcake production plant. Iran has explored two other potential Uranium production routes. One was the extraction of Uranium from phosphoric acid. Using research scale equipment, small quantities of yellowcake were successfully produced at the Tehran Nuclear research Center (TNRC) laboratories. The second route explored by Iran was the production of yellowcake using percolation leaching. Using this technique, Iran produced an estimated several hundred kilograms of yellowcake using temporary facilities, now dismantled, located at the Gchine mining site. Iran carried out most of its experiments in Uranium conversion between 1981 and 1993 at TNRC and at the ESFAHAN nuclear Technology Center (ENTC) with some experiments being carried out through early 2002. In 1991, Iran entered into discussions with a foreign supplier for the construction at ESFAHAN of an industrial scale conversion facility. Construction of this facility begun in the late 1990s and consists of several conversion lines. Iran has acknowledged that it had imported in 1991 natural Uranium, in a variety of forms. The Agency has also sought to confirm the declarations of Iran concerning the quantities of nuclear material involved in Iran's conversion experiments.
In 1985, Iran initiated its efforts in gas centrifuges enrichment with a search of available technical literature. Iran acquired through a clandestine supply network drawings for P-1 centrifuge, according to IRAN, gas centrifuge R&D testing began at TNRC in 1988 and continued there until 1995. In 2001, IRAN began the construction of two facilities at NATANZ, the smaller scale PEEP, planned to have some 1000 centrifuges for enrichment up to 5% U-235. In June 2003, IRAN reiterated that its centrifuge R&D had commenced only in 1997, with centrifuge testing having taken place in the Plasma physics building of TNRC. In its letter of 21 October 2003, IRAN finally acknowledged that a limited number of tests, using small amounts of UF6 had been conducted in 1999 and 2002 at the KALAYE company workshop.
List of locations relevant to the implementation of safeguards in IRAN:
NTANZ: pilot fuel enrichment plant (PEEP). KARAJ: Radioactive waste storage TEHRAN: Tehran research Reactor, Waste handling facility (WHF), KALAYE electric company, Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose laboratories (JHL).
ESFAHAN Nuclear technology center: Uranium chemistry laboratory (UCL).
Uranium conversion facility (UCF). Heavy water zero power reactor (HWZPR) Fuel manufacturing plant (FMP). ARAK: Iran nuclear research reactor(IR-40), Heavy water production plant(HWPP). ANARAK: waste storage site.
Literature :
*U.S. Department of state(treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons) *NPT. Signed at Washington, London, Moscow, 1968. *Ratification advised by U.S, senate March 13, 1969 *Statement on nuclear disarmament (article VI) by Gholam hossein Dehghani counselor Of the permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of IRAN. the Boston Globe Friday, Nov 21, 2003 .
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