Until last spring, it seemed as if
Iran and the United States were moving toward a discreet dialogue
designed to defuse more than two decades of antagonism. Now, however,
with the release of fresh evidence that Iran may be pursuing nuclear
weapons, tensions between the old adversaries have reached a new high.
Ask any official in Tehran and you will hear the same thing: Iran does
not plan to manufacture nuclear weapons but wants to reserve the right
to do so. This is almost word for word what the late shah told a group
of scientists and officials in Tehran in 1970, shortly after Iran
signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. A few weeks later, the
Iranian Atomic Agency was reorganized into a major government
department headed by a deputy prime minister.
At the time, the shah's goal was to build 20 nuclear power stations
over a ten-year period, producing a total of 30,000 megawatts of
atomic energy. The reason was that Iran's energy consumption was
expected to triple by the year 2000. At that rate, Iran would have
been forced to use practically all of its oil output to generate
electricity for domestic consumption, thus losing its single-largest
source of foreign currency. The shah also invested in a new company,
Eurodif, to find and market uranium in partnership with France, Italy,
Spain, Belgium, and Gabon. (It was not until the late 1970s that
uranium deposits were found in Iran itself, and thus Tehran initially
looked to West Africa as a source of supply.)
By 1976, work on the first of the projected nuclear power stations had
started at Bushehr, a peninsula on the Persian Gulf. The station was
slated for completion in 1980. In 1977, research began at another
nuclear power station at Dar-Khuywayyen, near Ahvaz, in the oil-rich
province of Khuzistan. But in 1979, the shah's regime collapsed as
Ayatollah Ruhallah Khomeini seized power in Tehran.
One of Khomeini's first acts was to scrap the entirety of the shah's
grandiose modernization program ? including the nuclear project. In
1983, a squadron of French heavy bombers attacked the Bushehr nuclear
power station, damaging its abandoned infrastructure. The planes,
painted in Iraqi colors, had been "lent" to Saddam Hussein
by the French government and were flown by retired French and Belgian
pilots. The raid was presented by then-president Saddam Hussein as
retaliation for the destruction of the Iraqi nuclear power station at
Osirak in 1981, though everyone knew that Osirak had been knocked out
by Israeli Phantom jets painted in Iranian colors.
After Khomeini's death in 1989, his successors decided to revive the
late shah's modernization programs. An inspection team dispatched in
1990 by the German company Siemens, which had started building the
Bushehr plant before the revolution, reported that it could be revived
and completed: Apparently the French pilots had not done as good a job
at Bushehr as the Israelis had at Osirak.
Under pressure from Washington, however, the Germans quickly withdrew
their offer to complete Bushehr. For almost three years, Iran shopped
around, looking for partners to help finish the project. Russia agreed
to help, in exchange for an $800 million contract. And so, by the year
2000, Bushehr was a bustling construction site. Nuclear power from
Bushehr is scheduled to enter the nation's electrical network by March
2004.
The U.S. has alleged for some time that Iran has already begun
manufacturing atomic bombs and may have up to ten such bombs by 2005.
Until recently, international opinion was prepared to give Iran the
benefit of the doubt, seeing Washington's position as "typical
American bullying." A series of incidents has changed that view.
Last March, satellite photos were released showing secret facilities
linked to Iran's nuclear program. At one location near Natanz, close
to the central Iranian desert, stands a sophisticated facility that
produces high-speed centrifuges needed for enriching uranium. To
produce a Hiroshima-sized bomb, it takes a maximum of 25 kilos of
enriched uranium ? for which 1,000 centrifuges are needed. It is
estimated that the Natanz facility, when completed, will have the
capacity to produce up to 5,000 centrifuges every year.
Even more interestingly, it appears that Iran wants to expand its
nuclear options, limited currently to enriched uranium, to include the
capacity to produce plutonium ? a revival of the two-track strategy
devised in the 1970s. To do this, Iran would need to produce heavy
water. And the latest satellite photos and other intelligence material
show that Iran has built a heavy-water facility at Arak, west of
Tehran.
Both the Natanz and Arak facilities represent upper links in a chain
of nuclear technology. The first link of that chain is raw uranium,
which Iran discovered in the late 1970s in large quantities at
Sarcheshmeh, near Kerman, and Magas, in Baluchestan. According to some
estimates, Iran has one of the world's largest uranium deposits ?
large enough to satisfy the country's energy needs and to sustain any
weapons programs it might wish to undertake for up to 200 years.
The middle link of the chain consists of nuclear stations like
Bushehr, which ? using uranium to produce electricity ? also
manufacture spent nuclear fuel, the raw material for enriched uranium.
The highest link, of course, is a bomb-making factory, which Iran may
or may not already have. One theory is that Iran will not build such a
facility until it has accumulated enough enriched uranium and
plutonium for a substantial number of nuclear warheads. Some experts
believe that the go-ahead could be given as early as 2005. Others
suggest slightly later dates, such as 2010.
As a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran is
obliged to undergo inspections by the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA). Last summer, Iran's credibility was badly shaken when
IAEA inspectors found traces of enriched uranium at one of the sites
they visited. The Iranians could not explain the presence of
special-grade enriched uranium in a country that does not wish to
manufacture nuclear warheads. Things worsened when the IAEA was
confronted with evidence of the existence of the Natanz and Arak
facilities. The question had to be asked: If Iran was not pursuing
nuclear weapons, why all the secrecy? Consider Arak. Heavy water has
well-known civilian uses: If the production at Arak was entirely
innocent, why did Iran choose to conceal its existence? IAEA director
Mohamed El-Baradei asked Iran to explain the latest findings.
El-Baradei's plea was followed by a letter signed by the British,
French, and German foreign ministers calling on Iran to cooperate with
the IAEA and to sign an additional protocol to the NPT allowing
impromptu inspections of all suspected sites. The European Union also
intervened, promising Iran financial and technological aid for its
energy project in exchange for an immediate end to all
military-related nuclear programs. Failing that, the EU could employ
economic and diplomatic sanctions. Ironically, Washington adopted a
softer position: The Bush administration said it would be satisfied if
Iran signed the additional protocol to the NPT.
Faced with the EU's surprisingly tough stance, the Iranian leadership
met with the foreign ministers of Britain, France, and Germany in
Tehran on October 21. The result was an announcement by Hasan Rowhani,
secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, that Iran would
sign the additional protocol allowing unlimited access to inspectors.
Furthermore, Rowhani announced that Iran would, for an "interim
period," suspend uranium enrichment "to express its goodwill
and create a new atmosphere of trust."
Whether the regime is prepared to alter its long-term nuclear strategy
is still an open question. In nuclear policy, the Iranian leadership
is facing its toughest dilemma in more than 20 years. On one hand,
there is a strong desire to develop an arsenal of nuclear weapons as a
national deterrent: Iran is located in a rough neighborhood that
includes at least five states with nuclear weapons. On the other hand,
pursuing a nuclear program will isolate Iran, lead to new sanctions,
and give the United States a pretext not only to destroy Iran's
nuclear centers, but even to use a mixture of military and political
pressure to topple the regime itself.
That fear is well grounded: Reports suggest that covert action could
be used against Iran's nuclear installations. The U.S. has already
recruited a number of Mujahedin Khalq elements in Iraq and won a
pledge from their leader, Massoud Rajavi, to help with sabotage
attacks inside Iran if necessary. If the U.S. and/or Israel were to
strike areas in Iran, Tehran would be unable to retaliate except
through Lebanese and Palestinian radical groups. The regime would
appear weak and vulnerable, thus encouraging domestic opponents who
dream of its overthrow.
Imagined as the ultimate weapon to ensure the safety of the mullahs'
regime, Tehran's nuclear program is fast developing into a serious
threat to the Islamic Republic itself.
