Khuzestand

Hezbollah's men of terror are both the strength and the Achilles heel of a movement that seeks to spread Islamic states, says Amir Taheri
The scene is Beirut, some years on, when Hezbollah has driven out the "Crusader-Zionists" and begun building the model Islamic state it has promised since the 1980s.

The rallying cry of Tony Blair — for western democracies to remain united in the global war against terror and engage in a battle of values — has not been heeded. The western powers, led by the United States, have run away from the Middle East, allowing the Islamic republic and its newly acquired allies in Al-Qaeda to set the agenda.

The former American University of Beirut has been replaced by the Iranian-sponsored Islamic University. As teenage "volunteers for martyrdom" chant "Allah, Koran, Khomeini", the new chancellor of the Islamic University prepares to read a message from Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the Iranian president.

He calls on the Lebanese to prepare for more sacrifices because his "jihad to wipe the Jewish stain of shame" off the map is only the beginning. He plans to liberate Egypt, north Africa and Spain.

Much has changed in Lebanon since the Party of God seized power. Women have been put into purdah and men forced to grow beards. Bars, pubs, discotheques, hotels with a louche reputation, and other "places of sin" have been closed.

Swimming on some beaches is allowed, though not for women, and men are required to enter the sea fully dressed. Gone are cinemas, theatres, the opera, comedy saloons, and bookshops selling publications that are "at variance with Islamic values".

Newspapers and magazines that had once criticised the Party of God or its patrons in Tehran have been banned. In accordance with the slogan "Hizb faqat Hizballah" (Only one party: Hezbollah!), Lebanon has become a one-party state.

All that is but a glimpse of what Lebanon could look like if and when Hezbollah, armed to the teeth and flush with Iranian cash, realises its dream of extending south Beirut to the whole of Lebanon.

The Lebanese know what all that could mean because they have seen it first hand in Beirut's suburbs controlled by Hezbollah. But how many might wish to live in such a system? The answer came in Lebanon's first free general election last year: Hezbollah and its allies won 14 of the 27 seats allocated to the Shi'ite community in the 128-seat national assembly. This means that some 89% of the Lebanese, including half the Shi'ite community, do not share Hezbollah's vision of an Islamic state modelled on Iran.

Much of Hezbollah's current power and prestige is due to the fact that it is the best funded and best armed political-military machine in the country, feeding thousands of families through employment in its businesses or with subsidies and stipends.

Nevertheless, it would be naive to deny the fact that the message of Hezbollah, which is in fact that of the Khomeinist revolution in Iran and the various Salafist movements in other Muslim countries, appeals to large segments of opinion in the Islamic world and beyond.

The message, first put by Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, is simple: the modern world, a creation of Crusader-Zionists, cannot reflect the values and aspirations of Muslims. It declares that Islam has the right, indeed the duty, to offer an alternative to the western model.

To build the Islamic model, Muslims must expel the Crusader-Zionists from their land, regain control of their destiny, build powerful states and proceed to liberate Muslim lands lost to the "infidel".

The same message is put by Muhammad Khatami, Iran's former president, in a more sophisticated way: the modern West, a child of the Renaissance, has led to colonialism, imperialism and world wars, pushing mankind to the brink of extinction through thermonuclear exchanges or environmental collapse. Western civilisation has undermined the family, done away with moral scruples, encouraged sexual licentiousness and promoted greed as man's highest motivation. It is Islam's mission to offer all nations, Muslim or not, an alternative vision.

Such a purely political interpretation of Islam illustrates why the West must engage in a battle of values, as Blair suggests. For this political interpretation has several advantages for its proponents.

It challenges western-style nationalist, liberal, democratic, socialist and communist parties. It also prevents theological discussions that would reveal divisions within Islam, even inside rival Sunni and Shi'ite camps.

Inside the Muslim world rival sects persecute and murder each other because of religious differences. The Egyptian government does not allow Shi'ites to have a mosque in Cairo while the Khomeinist regime denies that right to Sunnis in Tehran. Sectarian killings have become part of daily life in some Muslim countries, most glaringly in Pakistan and Iraq.

The more fanatical Sunnis and Shi'ites even refuse to shake hands with one another for fear of being "sullied".

However, when it comes to hating the West and dreaming of planting the flag of Islam on every capital, they are at one.

Another advantage of transforming Islam into a purely political anti-West movement is that it can attract support for its various "causes" inside the West itself.

There are many westerners who, prompted by self-loathing or as a result of ideological passions, share the hatred that Hezbollah and Al-Qaeda have for the "infidel" West. The problem is that while most self-loathers in the West no longer use violence to express their views, Islamism of the type represented by Al-Qaeda and Hezbollah is wedded to terrorism.

But there lies both the strength and the Achilles' heel of the Islamist movement.

Terrorism allows small groups to punch above their political weight. The Taliban militia consisted of just 6,000 men. The Fedayeen Islam, the backbone of the Khomeinist movement that rules Iran, originally consisted of just a few hundred assassins and their mentors. Even if we accept exaggerated figures presented by Israel, Hezbollah has a maximum of 8,000 fighters.

All those groups, however, were able, and some still are, to exert greater influence on their societies because they were ready to do something most people would not do: to use murder as an instrument of politics. By using systematic violence and terror, these groups hold their societies hostage. But terrorism could also be the undoing of Islamism.

The majority of Muslims abhor the use of indiscriminate violence even in response to genuine grievances let alone in pursuit of dreams of world conquest. And the history of the past three decades shows that Islamic terrorism can be defeated.

This happened in Egypt, where Islamists fought an exceptionally vicious campaign for a quarter of a century. It also happened in Algeria, where Islamic terrorism claimed some 150,000 lives in a decade. Turkey has managed to smash Islamist groups, most notably the Turkish branch of Hezbollah.

In the past five years Saudi Arabia has also crushed several Islamist groups, thus loosening their hold on segments of the population. Pakistan, too, has scored significant blows against Islamists — a fact largely ignored by the western media.

There is no doubt that force is often needed to break the terror machines that hold whole societies hostage. Algeria could not have returned to normal political life without defeating armed Islamists. Lebanon cannot live in peace unless Hezbollah is disarmed and turned into an ordinary political party.

Iraq will not know stability unless the insurgents and foreign terrorists are militarily crushed. But the war on terror has been won in several countries and can be won in others provided all those who wish to defeat Islamism remain united, resolute and patient.

The defeat of Islamism, an enemy not only of the West but also of the majority of Muslims, can be speeded up if force is complemented with political, ideological and cultural campaigns to reveal the bankruptcy of the Islamist doctrine. What is urgently needed is a common understanding in the West, and among modernising forces within Islam, of what is at stake.

This is not the first time that western values, of which many are now universal, have been challenged by mortal foes prepared to use violence, terrorism and war. In every previous instance those foes were defeated because they offered despotism and despair.

There is no reason why the outcome should be different this time — or that the Khomeinist University should ever replace the American University of Beirut.

FOR A REAL LEBANESE PEACE
by Amir Taheri
New York Post

August 7, 2006 -- EVER since it emerged as an independent state almost 60 years ago, Lebanon has lived with three hopes and three fears.
One hope was that its religious and cultural diversity would help Lebanon escape despotism in the name of any faith or ethnicity; another, that its location at the heart of the Middle East, and millenia-long links to Europe, would let the country become a bridge between the West and the Islamic world. Finally, there was the hope that trade would let Lebanon claim a role in the regional economy beyond its physical dimensions.

Conversely, the fears were that its location would leave Lebanon as a battlefield in proxy wars by outside powers, that its evolving diversity would tempt some communities to try to punch above their weight at the expense of others, and trade would bring businessmen in search of a fast buck to milk the nation in disregard of its long-term economic interests.

For half a century, Lebanon's history has been the story of those hopes and fears, waxing and waning in turn. A month ago, on the eve of the latest Israeli attack, the balance was tilted toward the hopes.

To be sure, many problems remained. The parliamentary majority was in open conflict with a president determined to keep his post in the face of popular pressure. The government had little control over almost a quarter of the country, where a different social and economic system was taking shape under Hezbollah. And the nation was apprehensive about a series of assassinations that had followed the murder of former Premier Rafiq Hariri.

Nevertheless, for the first time in years, the economy appeared to be growing, while the idea of a pluralist system was making inroads even in communities most influenced by sectarianism.

Now the war, triggered by the kidnapping of the Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah and the massive response of the Jewish state, has tipped the balance in favor of fear. Worse, it seems that, for the first time, all three of Lebanon's fears may be on the point of simultaneous realization.

The economy is in shambles, with capital in flight. Fear of sectarianism is also growing, with communities that had disbanded their militias reportedly again stockpiling weapons and reviving military units. Most importantly, the current war is plainly a proxy for a larger one that may yet shake the region.

What we witness is the clash of two visions for the Middle East: one set by President Bush, and the other represented by radical anti-American states and movements from North Africa to the Indian subcontinent.

The defeat of the pro-American camp would embolden the radical camp not only to reclaim dominance in Lebanon but also to pressure Iraq to switch sides once the U.S.-led Coalition leaves. Then the road would be open for shaping a regional system that could send shivers down spines in Western capitals. A clear defeat of Hezbollah, on the other hand, could embolden those who claim that force could and should be used to reshape realities on the ground.

It's all bad news for Lebanon - which is in no position to drive out the Israelis or to bring Hezbollah under government control.

The Lebanese need and deserve a break with the pattern of intervention that has ruined their lives for decades. For a small country that becomes a battlefield in proxy wars, the best hope is to be transformed into a buffer state.

Such a solution is possible - but it can't be achieved through the current, largely dishonest, diplomatic maneuvers. What is needed is a major rethinking of Lebanon's political structures, with massive foreign political, military and economic support to implement it.

The March 14 movement, which holds a majority of seats in the Lebanese parliament, had begun debating such ideas before this war started. The key question: How to reassure Lebanese communities that their legitimate interests, indeed their physical security, could be assured without support from foreign patrons?

One answer, then gaining popularity, was to set up a second chamber of parliament to act as a mixture of senate and supreme court, where all communities would enjoy an equal veto on issues that affect their fundamental interests.

Once the communities have that insurance policy, the country could be redesigned as a federal state on the Swiss model, with four or five cantons enjoying the widest possible autonomy. This would allow Lebanon's communities, with their varied vastly different life-styles sustained by different faiths and cultures, the space for peaceful interaction.

With the new chamber seeking national consensus on a few vital issues, the other chamber (the current parliament) would no longer have to be elected on the basis of sectarian quotas. This would enable genuine political currents to emerge, away from sectarian divides, allowing for people-based policies, as opposed to community-based pork-barrel politics - and making it harder for foreign powers to intervene by fomenting sectarian rivalries.

Such reforms are obviously impossible as long as foreign armies are present, whether Syrian, as previously, or Israeli, as now. The withdrawal of Israeli force from Lebanon is a sine qua non of reforming and shaping the Lebanese system to make the country a buffer state outside regional rivalries.

What to do in the interim?

A new version of the U.N. peacekeeping mission in Lebanon (UNIFIL) will be a non-starter. What is needed is a much larger multinational force with robust rules of engagement to enforce the peace rather than "observe" its (non)existence.

Hezbollah won't accept a force located only in the south, where the Shiite movement has held sway since the 1980s. The new multinational force should be present throughout the country, as an instrument of authority in the hands of Lebanon's elected government. Since that government already includes Hezbollah ministers, there would be no grounds for seeing it as a weapon in the hands of the Shiite party's domestic rivals.

To be effective, the force would need at least 20,000 men, with full logistics and materiel. Lebanon is slightly smaller than Kosovo, where a similar force, under the United Nations, has held the peace for years. Happily, Lebanon is already a U.N. member, with an elected government with a national army that could quickly assume the functions of the multinational force. The multinational force would likely not be needed for more than three years, until after the next Lebanese general election.

The only way to insure Lebanon against future tragedies is to help it assume its natural vocation as a meeting place of faiths and cultures, not a battleground for rival powers.

Amir Taheri is a member of Benador Associates.